CUPS : Secure Opportunistic Cloud of Things Framework based on Attribute Based Encryption Scheme Supporting Access Policy Update by Belguith, S et al.
CUPS: Secure Opportunistic Cloud of 
Things Framework based on Attribute 
Based Encryption Scheme Supporting 
Access Policy Update
Belguith, S, Kaaniche, N and Russello, G
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/spy2.85
Title CUPS: Secure Opportunistic Cloud of Things Framework based on 
Attribute Based Encryption Scheme Supporting Access Policy Update
Authors Belguith, S, Kaaniche, N and Russello, G
Type Article
URL This version is available at: http://usir.salford.ac.uk/id/eprint/51592/
Published Date 2019
USIR is a digital collection of the research output of the University of Salford. Where copyright 
permits, full text material held in the repository is made freely available online and can be read, 
downloaded and copied for non­commercial private study or research purposes. Please check the 
manuscript for any further copyright restrictions.
For more information, including our policy and submission procedure, please
contact the Repository Team at: usir@salford.ac.uk.
Received: 00 Month 0000 Revised: 00 Month 0000 Accepted: 00 Month 0000
DOI: xxx/xxxx
ARTICLE TYPE
CUPS: SecureOpportunistic Cloud of Things Framework based
on Attribute Based Encryption Scheme Supporting Access
Policy Update
Sana Belguith*1 | Nesrine Kaaniche2 | Giovanni Russello3
1 School of Computing, Science and
Engineering, University of Salford,
Manchester, UK
2Department of Computer Science, University
of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK
3Cyber Security Foundry,University of
Auckland, New Zealand, NZ
Correspondence
*Sana Belguith. Email: s.belguith@salford.ac.uk
Summary
Theever-growingnumberof Internet connecteddevices, coupledwith thenewcomputing trends,
namely within emerging opportunistic networks, engenders several security concerns. Most of
the exchanged data between the Internet of Things (IoT) devices are not adequately secured due
to resource constraints on IoT devices. Attribute Based Encryption is a promising cryptographic
mechanism suitable for distributed environments, providing flexible access control to encrypted
data contents. However, it imposes high decryption costs, and does not support access policy
update, for highly dynamic environments. This paper presents CUPS, an ABE-based framework
for opportunistic cloud of things applications, that securely outsources data decryption process
to edge nodes in order to reduce the computation overhead on the user side. CUPS allows end-
users tooffloadmostof thedecryptionoverhead toanedgenodeandverify the correctnessof the
received partially decrypted data from the edgenode.Moreover, CUPSprovides the access policy
update feature with neither involving a proxy-server, nor re-encrypting the enciphered data con-
tents and re-distributing the users’ secret keys. The access policy update feature in CUPS does
not affect the size of themessage received by the end-user which reduces the bandwidth and the
storage usage. Our comprehensive theoretical analysis proves that CUPS outperforms existing
schemes in terms of functionality, communication and computation overheads.
KEYWORDS:
Opportunistic computing, Cloud of things, Constant-size attribute based encryption, Decryption
delegation, Verifiability, Access policy update, Confidentiality, Access control.
1 INTRODUCTION
Opportunistic networks appeared as a promising type of Mobile Ad’hoc Networks, MANET for short 1. Indeed, they enable direct communication
between user-carried mobile devices, referred to as nodes, via short-range wireless technologies 2,3, instead of passing through the cellular net-
work. Hence, opportunistic networks are considered as an interesting communication technology in several urban scenarios, e.g., in overloaded
cellular network areas, and in non-urban scenarios, e.g., non-covered areas 4,5. In a nutshell, opportunistic networks are defined as infrastructure-
free: nodes store data, and carry it according to the related user mobility until a new communication opportunity arises to forward these data. This
store-carry-forward feature was first introduced as amain defining function of Delay Tolerant Networks (DTN) 6. Contrary to DTNs, in opportunis-
tic networks, the focus shifts from user-oriented to content-oriented data dissemination. This considerably reduces the network complexity, as
choosing appropriate intermediate nodes for forwarding data contents is no longer a priority. Instead, data dissemination depends on the mobility
patterns of users as well as some shared contents’ interests.
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FIGURE 1 Cloud of Things Architecture
Recently, the Internet of Things (IoT) appeared and gained an expanding interest 7,8. IoT has sparked a significant shift in all aspects of our lives
including business, industry and society. Today’s availability of low-cost embedded sensors and actuators offer unprecedented opportunity for
interconnecting smart buildings, factories, vehicles, power grids and other data infrastructures 9,10,11,12. Combining IoT and opportunistic networks
has fostered a new computing paradigm referred to as Opportunistic Computing (c.f., Figure 1 ). Exploiting devices’ contact opportunities for com-
munication is only a first step. Indeed, this device-to device communication can be used to share data, utilise other devices resources and compute
tasks remotely.
Hence, adopting opportunistic computing to leverage secure content dissemination is an interesting solution, for IoT application 13,14. However,
in the context of opportunistic networks, secure content sharing remains an issue. An increasing need to design secure and efficient data sharing
protocols adapted to IoT applications has appeared. Due to their limited storage and computation capacities, IoT devices are usually assisted with
cloud services to store and process generated data 15,16,17, generally considered as a semi-trusted third party.
Data sharing schemes often rely on cryptographic algorithms to ensure the secrecy of shared data, between different groupmembers. Although
encryption mechanisms ensure data confidentiality against both curious cloud service providers and malicious users], the use of conventional
encryption approaches is not sufficient to support the enforcement of fine-grained access control policies 15,18. In fact, data confidentiality preser-
vationbecomesmore complicated, consideringflexible data sharing amonghighly dynamic groupof users, trying to foster anyopportunity to collect
and/or retrieve data.
These opportunistic groups require efficient sharing of deciphering keys between different authorized users. In fact, the subscription of a new
groupmember -basedon its availability in anarea-rangeandmain interests- shouldnot requireupdating the secret keysof existingusers tominimise
the key management complexity. Thus, the challenge lies in defining a comprehensive access control mechanism for outsourced data while both
ensuring data secrecy and flexible up-datable access policies.
Attribute based Encryption (ABE) ensures encrypted access control to outsourced data while limiting privacy leakage of data producers and
users 19,20,21. ABE consists of enciphering data with respect to an access policy over a set of attributes where users that possess the matching
attributes can recover data 8. Nowadays, with the emergence of IoT applications adapted to distributed and dynamic environments, several set-
tings require adding new users, strengthening access patterns and/or removing current users from systems. Hence, severe drawbacks that limit
ABE application to resource constrained systems have to be considered. On the one hand, ABE techniques incur high decryption costs due to the
execution of several pairing functions to verify and recover a plaintext. On the other hand, the update of access policies is not supported. Thus, the
addition/revocation of users needs the re-encryption of the encryptedmessage and the re-distribution of users’ secret keys.
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Proxy re-encryption techniques are introduced and used to update users in outsourced systems. Thesemechanisms allow a server to re-encrypt
stored data without accessing their content using a re-encryption key 22,23. Attribute-based Proxy Re-encryption (AB-PRE) systems have been
applied for access policy update. In AB-PRE, when the data owner decides to update access policies of some ciphertexts, she uses her private
key to generated a re-encryption key for each ciphertext to be changed from an old access policy to a new one. Afterwards, all the generated re-
encryption keys are uploaded to a proxy server to update the ciphertext using the received keys. Although AB-PRE schemes allow re-encryption
without decrypting ciphertext or accessing the plaintexts, it requires that the data owner generates valid re-encryption keys. When the number of
ciphertext rises, it becomes inefficient for a data owner to generate all the re-encryption keys and upload them to the proxy. Furthermore, this may
also be unfeasible for limited bandwidths. Therefore, attribute-based proxy re-encryption schemesmay not be efficientwhen updating a huge num-
ber of ciphertexts. Key Policy Attribute Based Encryption (KP-ABE) is widely applied to secure data in several distributed systems such as Publish
and Subscribe systems (Pub/Sub) 24,25,26, pay-TV systems 27, vehicular networks 28, ..., where rules on who may read a document must be specified
but it is unable to specify policies on a per-message basis. Obviously, these dynamic environments usually require efficiently adding new users
and/or revoking existent users. That is, KP-ABE consists in labeling user’s key by an access structure that specifies which type of ciphertext the key
can decrypt, while ciphertext are labeled by a set of attributes. Thus, KP-ABE are adapted to distributed and decentralized environments. Instead,
Ciphertext Policy Attribute Based Encryption (CP-ABE) schemes consists in associating an access structure to the ciphertext while assigning a set
of credentials to deciphering users. CP-ABE schemes supporting policy update have been recently explored by Jiang et al. 29,30.
In this paper, we introduce CUPS, a key policy attribute based encryption scheme, that supports policy update and verifiable computation
offloading, to leverage an opportunistic computing solution for cloud of things. CUPS is an extension of PU-ABE, our KP-ABE scheme supporting
adding and/or removing attributes from the access policy without sharing keys with the cloud server 31. PU-ABE 31, enables the encrypting entity
to generate a ciphertext involving encrypted data together with some extra components used for supporting the access policy update feature. The
ciphertext is forwarded to the cloud server that can update the access policy upon demand. Indeed, the cloud server does not need to be trusted.
That is, it stores and shares ciphertexts among authorised users and also executes access policy update algorithm as requested. While executing
these functionalities, the remote server is unable of decrypting any ciphertexts neither accessing any secret keys. In addition to this existent
feature, this extension introduces several new functions introduced hereafter.
Contributions – CUPS presents a key policy attribute based encryption scheme which supports access policy update and verifiable decryption-
outsourcing feature. This proposed scheme is suitable for bandwidth-limited applications as the size of the ciphertext received by end-users does
not depend on the number of attributes involved in the access policy. In CUPS, the encrypting entity generates a ciphertext involving encrypted
data together with some extra components used for supporting the access policy update feature. The ciphertext is forwarded to the cloud server
that can update the access policy upon demand. Indeed, the cloud server does not need to be trusted. That is, it stores and shares ciphertexts
among authorised users and also executes the access policy update algorithm as requested. While executing these functionalities, the remote
server is unable of decrypting any ciphertexts neither accessing any secret keys. CUPS also supports secure delegation of the decryption algorithm
to an edge node. This latter can partially decrypt the enciphered data content and forward the result to the requesting user. The user can then
retrieve the plaintext by executing low cost mathematical operations. To achieve a secure delegation, CUPS allows the user to verify the accuracy
of the received partially decrypted ciphertext to ensure that it has been honestly generated by the edge node. These features make CUPS is useful
to be applied in dynamic environments requiring efficiently adding/removing users.
Our contributions are as follows:
1. CUPS provides a comprehensive framework for efficient and secure data sharing adapted to opportunistic cloud of things scenarios. It
supports access policy update without requiring cipherext re-encryption or re-issuing users’ secret keys. CUPS does not rely on a proxy
re-encryption server to execute policy update procedures. In addition, unlike most ABE techniques, the size of the ciphertext that the end-
user will receive is constant and independent from the number of attributes involved in the access policy. Therefore, CUPS generates a
constant-size ciphertext, w.r.t. the end-user, that reduces bandwidth utilisation and storage costs.
2. CUPS extends the PU-ABE scheme 31 by adding a computation offloading feature. Indeed, the IoT device can offload to the nearest edge
node a part of the decryption process. This latter performs most of the decryption operations without accessing the plaintext, and returns
a partially decrypted ciphertext to the intended user. In return, the user can retrieve the plaintext by executing low cost mathematical
operations.
3. CUPS allows the end-user to verify the accuracy of the partially decrypted message received from the edge node. This property is referred
to as verifiability. Indeed, the user is able to check that the retrieved plaintext matches the ciphertext originally requested and downloaded
from the cloud server.
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PaperOrganisation – The remainder of thiswork is as follows: Section 2 gives an overviewof the proposed framework and describes the system and
security models. Section 3 reviews related work and Section 4 presents the mathematical background. In Section 5, an overview of CUPS is intro-
duced and the detailed construction is presented. Section 6 presents a rigorous security discussion. Finally, a theoretical analysis of computational
performances is presented in Section 7, before concluding in Section 8.
2 FRAMEWORK SPECIFICATION
In this section, we first present the network model, detailing the involved entities and their interactions in Section 2.1. Then, we detail the security
requirements that the proposed system should fulfill in Section 2.2. Afterwards, we present the system and security models of the proposed CUPS
framework in subsection 2.3 and subsection 2.5, respectively.
2.1 Architecture
As presented in Figure 2 , CUPS framework considers a cloud service provider that stores data generated by data owners and share them among
authorised users. Five different entities are defined as follows:
• TheCentral TrustedAuthority (CTA), knownby theAttribute authority, is responsible for generating theglobal public parameters and issuing
users’ secret keys. CTA is considered as a trusted entity in ourmodel.
• The Cloud Server (RC) is a remote cloud server who stores and shares data among authorised users. RC is also responsible of executing the
update algorithm to change the access policy involved in the ciphertext, w.r.t. the data owner’s recommendations.
• Edge Node (EN) is responsible for partially decrypting a ciphertext using a transformation key received from the user. Indeed, the user
derives a couple of public and private transformation keys from his secret keys. The user shares the public key with EN to allow the partial
decryption of ciphertext, while keeping secret the private transformation key to be used for the final local data retrieval.
• The data owner (O) is the data producer. he defines access rights and encrypts data with respect to them before outsourcing to the cloud. In
addition, the data owner generates extra ciphertext components used by the update algorithm.
• The data user (U) requests access to outsourced data. he delegates a part of the decryption process to EN. Specifically, U is responsible for
using his secret keys to derive transformation keys usedbyEN topartially decrypt the ciphertext. Finally,Udecrypts and verifies the partially
decrypted ciphertext that is received from EN. A user may bemalicious if he tries to access data without authorisation.
2.2 Security Requirements
To design an efficient attribute based encryption scheme supporting efficient access policy update and computation delegation features, the
following requirements need to be achieved:
• access policy update – our CUPS scheme should ensure adding new attributes and/or removing attributes from the access policy.
• flexible access control – our proposal should ensure flexible security policies among dynamic groups of users, w.r.t. forward secrecy and
backward secrecy.
– backward secrecymeans that a new added user to a group is unable to decrypt information created prior to their introduction.
– forward secrecymeans that a compromise of the secret key does not affect the secrecy of future encrypted data.
• low computation overhead and storage cost – the proposed algorithms should have low processing complexity and acceptable storage cost to
be adapted to resource-constrained devices and distributed environments.
• data confidentiality – our CUPS scheme has to protect the secrecy of outsourced and encrypted data contents against curious users and
curious cloud service provider.
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FIGURE 2 CUPS Architecture
2.3 SystemModel
The CUPS framework is composed of four phases, i.e., SYS_INIT, STORAGE, UPDATE and RETRIEVAL, defined with respect to seven randomized
algorithms detailed hereafter.
The SYS_INIT phase is executed once by the CTA. It permits to generate and publish system public parameters to all involved entities and derives
users’ private keys associated to their attributes. The SYS_INIT phase is based on two algorithms, denoted by setup and keygen.
During the STORAGE phase, the data owner (O) defines the access policy, i.e., set of attributes S . This phase includes one randomized algorithm,
denoted by encrypt, to encipher the data content w.r.t. the access policyS , while pointing out either the content can be updated or not.
The UPDATE phase is executed by the cloud provider, upon the request of the data owner. It is based on one algorithm, denoted by update that
supports both the addition and removal of attributes from access policies.
During the RETRIEVAL phase, the user (U) has first to request access to a particular data content, for the cloud provider. Once retrieved from
RC, U runs an interactive protocol with the edge node (EN), to recover the original data content. The RETRIEVAL phase relies on three different
algorithms, referred to as transform, decryptout and decrypt. Indeed, U executes the transform algorithm to derive a transformation key, relying on his
private keys that satisfy the encryption set of attributesS associated to the requested data content. The transformation key is then sent to ENalong
with the downloaded ciphertext from RC. This latter performs the decryptout algorithm and generates a partially decrypted data content. Finally,
based on the partially deciphered data file, U is able to finalise the decryption process. Recall that U is able check whether the received partially
deciphered content was correctly generated, thanks to the support of the verifiability property.
The proposed CUPS framework consists of seven randomized algorithms: setup, encrypt, update, keygen, transform, decryptout and decrypt,
definedw.r.t. the four procedures, as follows:
• SYS_INIT phase:
setup(ξ) → (pp, msk) – the setup algorithm is performed by a central trusted authority, known by the attribute authority. It takes as input a
security parameter ξ and outputs the public parameters pp and the secret master key msk.
keygen(pp, msk,Ψ) → sk – this randomized algorithm is executed by the attribute authority to derive the secret keys of a user U. Given the
public parameters pp, an access policyΨ of the user U and the secret master key msk. The algorithm outputs the user’s secret key skw.r.t. to
Ψ.
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• STORAGE phase:
encrypt(pp,S,M)→ CT – the encryption algorithm is performed by the data owner (O). It takes as inputs the public parameters pp, the set
of the encryption attributesS and themessageM. This algorithm outputs the encryptedmessage, referred to asCT.
• UPDATE phase:
update(pp,CT, ind,U)→ CT′– the update algorithm is executed by a cloud server. It takes as inputs the public parameters pp, a ciphertext
CT that contains the set of enciphering attributes S = {ai}i=1..m such that |S| = m, an operation indicator ind where ind = add or ind =
revoke and a set of attributes U with U ∩ S = ∅ if ind = add or U ⊂ S if ind = revoke. It outputs a new ciphertextCT′ for the new encrypting
set of attributesS′ such asS′ = S ∪ U orS′ = S \ U w.r.t. ind value.
• RETRIEVAL phase:
transform(pp,Ψ, sk)→ tk – the transform algorithm is performed byU having an access policyΨ and their related secret keys sk. transform
takes as input pp and sk. It generates the transformation key tk = (tpk, tsk) related to sk, where tpk and tsk are the public and private
transformation keys, respectively.
decryptout(pp, sk,CT
′) → Y – is executed by EN . To retrieve the partially decrypted messageY, this algorithm takes as input pp, the trans-
formation key tpk, a set of attributes Ψ and the updated ciphertext CT′. Note that CT′ can be CT if the update algorithm has not been
executed.
decrypt(Y, tsk) → M –U executes decrypt to retrieve M. This algorithm takes tsk and the partially decrypted ciphertext Y as input and
outputsM.
2.4 ThreatModel
In this section, we explain the considered attackmodel based onwhich we discuss the security properties of our proposed scheme.
• An honest but curious cloud server provider (RC). RC is honest as it generates accurate inputs or outputs, during the different steps of the proto-
col, and performs calculations properly. However, it is curious to gain extra data from the protocol, such as obtaining credentials/attributes
of a data user, retrieving the plaintext, or distinguishing the data owner based on the signcrypted content. As such, we consider the honest
but curious attackmodel against the confidentiality w.r.t adaptive replayable chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-RCPA) (c.f, 2.5.1).
• An unauthorised data user. This attacker could be a data user (or an external entity), whose attributes do not satisfy the access policy asso-
ciated with the ciphertext, or could be a revoked user. We also consider a set of colluding users on the attributes, who do not satisfy the
access policy associated with the ciphertext and try to merge their attributes to retrieve the plaintext, in this attack model. These unau-
thorised users attempt to decrypt the content and access the plaintext. As such, we consider this attack model against the confidentiality
requirements w.r.t adaptive replayable chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-RCPA) (c.f, 2.5.1).
• A lazy or malicious edge node (EN). This attacker tries to forge a non-authentic partial decrypted ciphertext, or returns an old previously
computed ciphertext. A security scheme against this attacker should satisfy verifiability feature (c.f, 2.5.2).
2.5 SecurityModel
In this section, we explain the considered attackmodel based onwhich we discuss the security properties of our proposed scheme.
2.5.1 Confidentiality
For designing a secure policy-update attribute based encryption scheme, we consider the case of malicious adversaries with respect to the indis-
tinguishability property. The indistinguishability property means that if an adversary has some information about the plaintext, he should not learn
about the ciphertext. This security notion requires the computational impossibility to distinguish between two messages chosen by the adversary
with a probability greater than a half.
To design the most suitable security model considering the confidentiality requirement, we adopt an updated security model to capture security
requirements related to policy updates 30. CUPS is said to be indistinguishable against non-adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks if there is no proba-
bilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary that canwin the Expconf security gamewith non-negligible advantage. The Expconf game is formally defined,
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between an adversaryA and a challenger C as follows:
INITIALISATION –A selects a set of encryption attributes S∗ (i.e; S∗ corresponds to the set of attributes specified for the encryption) to be used
for encrypting the challenge ciphertext, as a set of attributesS∗ = {ai}i=1..m where |S∗| = m.A sendsS∗ to C.
SETUP – the challenger C runs the setup(ξ) algorithm, sends the public parameters pp to the adversaryA and keeps secret themaster key msk.
Phase 1Queries – first, C sets an empty table T. Then,A is able to request the following queries, for each session i:
• Private Key Query – the adversary A queries an access policy ΨA,i. The challenger C answers by running the keygen(pp, msk,ΨA,i)
algorithm and sends the resulting secret key skA,i to the adversary A. Note that the access policy ΨA,i does not satisfy the encryption
attribute setS∗.
• Transformation KeyQuery –A queries the secret transformation keys tkA,i, w.r.t.ΨA,i. C searches the entry (ΨA,i, skA,i, tkA,i) in table T.
It returns the transformation key if it exists in table T, otherwise C executes the transform algorithm to generate tkA,i and forwards them to
the adversary.
CHALLENGE PHASE – during the challenge phase,A picks two equal length cleartextsM0∗ andM1∗ as well as an attribute set U∗ with |U∗| = t
U∗ ∩ S∗ = ∅ if ind = add or U∗ ⊂ S∗ if ind = revoke. The challenger C chooses a random bit b from {0, 1} with S ′∗ = S∗ \ U∗ for ind = add or
S ′∗ = S∗ ∩ U∗ for ind = revoke and computes the challenge encrypted message CTb∗ = encrypt(pp,S∗,Mb∗). It gives CTb∗ to the adversary if
U = ∅, otherwiseCT′∗b = update(pp,CTb∗, ind,U∗).
QUERY PHASE 2– in this phase, the adversaryA can query a polynomially bounded number of queries as inQUERY PHASE 1, except thatA cannot
query secret keys related to an access policyΨ that satisfiesS∗.
GUESS –A tries to guess which messageMi, where i ∈ {0, 1} corresponds to the enciphered data CTb∗. Thus,A outputs a bit b′ of b and wins
the game if b = b′. The advantage of the adversaryA in the above game is defined as:
AdvA[ExpConf (1ξ)] = |Pr[b = b′]− 1
2
|
Definition 1. CUPS fulfills the confidentiality property if there is no adversary that can succeed the security game Expconf with non-negligible
advantage.
2.5.2 Verifiability
This scheme is said to be verifiable if there is no probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary that can win the Expverif security game with non-
negligible advantage. The Expverif game is formally defined, between an adversaryA and a challenger C as follows:
INITIALISATION –A selects a set of encryption attributes S∗ (i.e; S∗ corresponds to the set of attributes specified for the encryption) to be used
for encrypting the challenge ciphertext, as a set of attributesS∗ = {ai}i=1..m where |S∗| = m.A sendsS∗ to C.
SETUP – the challenger C runs the setup(ξ) algorithm, sends the public parameters pp to the adversaryA and keeps secret themaster key msk.
Phase 1Queries – first, C sets an empty table T. Then,A is able to request the following queries, for each session i:
• Private Key Query – the adversary A queries an access policy ΨA,i. The challenger C answers by running the keygen(pp, msk,ΨA,i)
algorithm and sends the resulting secret key skA,i to the adversary A. Note that the access policy ΨA,i does not satisfy the encryption
attribute setS∗.
• Transformation KeyQuery –A queries the secret transformation keys tkA,i, w.r.t.ΨA,i. C searches the entry (ΨA,i, skA,i, tkA,i) in table T.
It returns the transformation key if it exists in table T, otherwise C executes the transform algorithm to generate tkA,i and forwards them to
the adversary.
Challenge – during the challenge phase,A chooses a challenge messageM∗ and sends it to the challenger. The challenger C encryptsM∗ and
generates the verification keyV∗ underS∗. Then, the generated ciphertextCT∗ is returned to the adversary.
QUERY PHASE 2– in this phase, the adversaryA can query a polynomially bounded number of queries as inQUERY PHASE 1, except thatA cannot
query secret keys related to an access policyΨ that satisfiesS∗.
Forge – A generates a random partially decrypted ciphertext Y∗ without executing the Decryptout algorithm. A wins the game if
Decrypt(pp, tpk,S∗,Y∗) /∈ {M∗,⊥} and the verification of the partially decrypted ciphertext is valid.
A’s advantage is noted as:
AdvA[Expverif (1ξ)] = |Pr[Expverif (1ξ)] = 1|
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Definition 2. CUPS fulfills the verifiability property if there is no adversary that can succeed the security game Expverif with non-negligible
advantage.
3 ATTRIBUTE BASED ENCRYPTION SCHEMES
Attribute-based Encryption (ABE) has been designed to ensure encrypted flexible access control for outsourced data 32. Unlike traditional public
key encryption schemes, ABE consists in encrypting data formanyusers. Therefore, decrypting entities’ private keys and encrypted data are labeled
with a set of attributes or a structure over attributes. A user is able to decrypt a ciphertext if there is a match between her private key and the
ciphertext 33. Attribute based encryption schemes are classified into two categories, namely: Key-Policy ABE (KP-ABE) and Ciphertext-Policy ABE
(CP-ABE) 34. In KP-ABE, ciphertexts are labeled with a set of attributes while users’ private keys are associated with an access policy which can be
anymonotonic structure. The user is able to decrypt the ciphertext if her access policy is satisfied by the attributes embedded in the ciphertext. KP-
ABE schemes have been widely applied to secure data in distributed systems such as Internet of Things, publish and subscribe systems, intelligent
transport systems, etc. 35.
3.1 Constant size KP-ABE
Although ABE schemes ensure flexible access control to encrypted data, the communication and computation overhead as well as the bandwidth
consumption increaseexponentiallywith thenumberof attributes required in theaccess policies. To save the storage cost of ciphertext andprocess-
ing overhead of encryption, attribute based encryption schemeswith constant ciphertext size have been introduced 36,37,38,39. In these schemes, the
size of the generated ciphertext does not depend on the number of attributes used on the threshold access policies, which presents an interesting
feature mainly for resource-constrained devices. Herranz et al. 36 have proposed the first constant size threshold ciphertext-policy attribute based
encryption scheme. Indeed, the ciphertext size is constant and does not depend on the number of attributes involved in the threshold access poli-
cies. Afterwards, several CP-ABE schemes with constant cipheretxt size have been proposed 37,40,41. Due to the construction of CP-ABE schemes,
monotone access policies based schemes can not be extended to ensure a constant ciphertext size. For instance, these schemes consist in only using
threshold or conjunctive access policies which do not provide the desired expressiveness 42.
Several expressive KP-ABE schemes with constant ciphertext size have been designed 38,39,43. Wang et al. 39 have proposed a KP-ABE scheme
with constant ciphertext size. This scheme relies on amonotone access policy to express the users’ attributes.
Although, these schemes ensure reduced communication and computation costs, they still present amajor limitation which is their incapacity of
changing access policies of ciphertexts. In dynamic environments, users may be often added or removed, then access policies should be updated to
support these changes. Recently, the first CP-ABE with policy update has been proposed by Jiang et al. 29,30. The authors introduced a new variant
of CP-ABE supporting access policy update that captures the functionalities of attribute addition and revocation from access policies. They provide
twoCP-ABE schemes supporting AND-gate access policies with constant-size ciphertexts. The first KP-ABE scheme supporting attributes addition
is recently introduced by Belguith et al. 44. In this scheme, the ciphertext is updated by the cloud provider to add new attributes to the encryption
set of attributes. Therefore, new users can be added and are able to decrypt the ciphertext without re-encrypting the ciphertext neither re-issuing
existent users secret keys. Later, the sameauthors have extended their scheme to support attributes’ revocation. The introduced schemePU-ABE 31
support both attributes revocation and addition. Indeed, users can be added or removed from system without relying on a proxy server neither
re-issuing secret keys nor re-encryption the ciphertext.
3.2 Decryption Delegation in ABE
One key limitation of ABE schemes is the high decryption cost, which grows with the complexity of the access policies. Indeed, the decryption cost
is related to the execution of several pairing functions 12,45,46,41,47.
To mitigate this issue, Green et al. 47 proposed to outsource the execution of the decryption algorithm to a semi trusted server. To this end, a
user needs to derive a pair of new keys called public and private transformation keys based on his own secret key. Then, the cipheretext and the
public transformation key are forwarded to the semi trusted server that is able to partially decrypt the ciphertext using the received transformation
key without accessing the plaintext. This partially decrypted ciphertext is then returned to the user who uses the private transformation key to
fully decrypt the ciphertext by performing only one exponentiation operation. By applying this technique, users reduce the computation costs at
their side. The delegation of the decryption algorithm to semi trusted server requires that the user verifies the correctness of the received partially
decrypted ciphertext. A lazy server may try to forward previously partially decrypted ciphertext 45. To overcome this limitation, several verifiable
outsourced ABE schemes were proposed 48,49.
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Lai et al. 46 proposed an outsourced ABE scheme where the user is able to verify the correctness of the partially decrypted ciphertext. This
scheme encrypts two different messages, one is the original message and the other is a random message. The ciphertext involves a component
C˜ generated using a combined hash functions over both messages. After receiving the partially decrypted ciphertext, the user decrypts the two
messages and compare the result to C˜ to verify the correctness of the decryption performed by the server.
An ABE scheme with both outsourced encryption and decryption algorithms was described by Wang et al. 50. In this scheme, the data owner is
assisted by a proxy server to partially encrypt the data. Then, the data owner uses the partially encrypted data to encrypt themessage and generate
the ciphertext to be outsourced to the cloud server. On the other side, users outsource the decryption algorithm to a semi-trusted server who
partially decrypts the ciphertext. In 2017, Li et al. 41 proposed aCP-ABE scheme that supports the verifiable outsourced decryption feature. Beyond
reducing decryption overhead, this scheme incurs low communication costs as it generates a constant-size ciphertext. Recently, PHOABE, the first
multi authority CP-ABE scheme with outsourced decryption has been introduced 12. In this scheme, a user may delegate the decryption algorithm
to be executed by a semi-trusted server while being able to verify the correctness of the partially decrypted ciphertext.
4 MATHEMATICAL BACKGROUND
In this section, we first introduce the access structure in section 4.1. Then, in section 4.2, we present the bilinear maps. Finally, we introduce some
security assumptions.
4.1 Access Policies
Access policies can be represented as a boolean functions of attributes or a Linear Secret Sharing Scheme (LSSS) matrix.
Access Structure – LetP = {P1, · · · ,Pn} be a set of parties. A collection A ⊆ 2{P1,··· ,Pn} is monotone if ∀B,C ifB ∈ A andB ⊆ C thenC ∈ A.
An access structure is a collection A of non-empty subsets of {P1, · · · ,Pn}, such as A ⊆ 2{P1,··· ,Pn}\∅. Note that any access structure can be con-
verted into a boolean function. Boolean functions can be defined as an access tree, where the leaves present the attributes while the intermediate
and the root nodes are the logical operators AND (∧) andOR (∨).
Linear Secret Sharing Schemes (LSSS) – LetP be a set of parties,A be l× nmatrix, and ρ : {1, 2, · · · , l} → P be a function that maps a row to a party
for labeling. A secret sharing scheme for access structureΨ over a set of partiesP is a linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS) inZp and is represented
by (A, ρ) if it consists of two efficient algorithms:
• Share((A, ρ), s): The share algorithm takes as input s ∈ Zp which is to be shared. It randomly chooses β1, · · · , βn ∈ Zp, and defines β =
(β1 = s, β2, · · · , βk)T. It outputsM.β as the vectors of l shares. The share λi =< Ai, βT > belongs to party ρ(i), whereAi is the i− th of A.
• Recon((A, ρ),S): The reconstruction algorithm takes as input an access set S ∈ A. Let I = {i|ρ(i) ∈ S}. It outputs a set of constants {µi}i∈I
such that∑i∈I µi · λi = β1 = s.
4.2 BilinearMaps
LetG1,G2 andGT be threemultiplicative groups of a finite field having the same order p. An admissible asymmetric pairing function eˆ fromG1×G2
inGT has to be bilinear, non degenerate and efficiently computable.
4.3 The General Diffie-Hellman Exponent Assumption
In our CUPS construction, we make use of the generalisation of the Diffie-Hellman exponent assumption, formally defined by Boneh et al. in 51.
The authors have introduced a class of assumptions that appeared with the use of pairing-based schemes namely Decisional DiffieâA˘S¸Hellman
assumption (DDH), Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH), and q-Bilinear Diffie Hellman Exponent (qâL´ŠBDHE) assumptions, detailed hereafter.
Let B = (p,G1,G2,G, eˆ : G1 × G2 → G) be a bilinear map group such that G1 = G2 = G. Let g0 be a generator of G and set
g = eˆ(g0, g0) ∈ G. Let s and n be positive integers and P,Q ∈ Fp[X1, · · · ,Xn]s be two s-tuples of n-variate polynomials over Fp where
P = (p1, · · · , ps) and Q = (q1, · · · , qs) and p1 = q1 = 1. For any function h : Fp → Ω and any vector (x1, · · · , xn) ∈ Fnp, h(P(x1, · · · , xn))
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stands for (h(p1(x1, · · · , xn)), · · · , h(ps(x1, · · · , xn))) ∈ Ωs and h(Q(x1, · · · , xn)) stands for (h(q1(x1, · · · , xn)), · · · , h(qs(x1, · · · , xn))) ∈ Ωs. Let
f ∈ Fp[X1, · · · ,Xn], it is said that f depends on (P,Q), which we denote by f ∈ P,Q, when there is a linear decomposition
f =
∑
1≤i,j≤s
ai,j · pi · pj +
∑
1≤i≤s
bi · qI , ai,j , bi ∈ Zp
LetP,Q be as above and f ∈ Fp[X1, · · · ,Xn]. The (P,Q, f)-General Diffie- Hellman Exponent problems are defined as follows.
Definition 1: (P,Q, f)-GDHE. Given a tupleH(x1, · · · , xn) = (gP(x1,··· ,xn)0 , gQ(x1,··· ,xn)) ∈ Gs1 × Gs, compute gf(x1,··· ,xn).
Definition 2: (P,Q, f)-GDDHE. GivenH(x1, · · · , xn) ∈ Gs1 × Gs, compute gf(x1,··· ,xn) as above, decide whetherT = gf(x1,··· ,xn).
We refer to 51 for a proof that (P,Q, f)-GDHE and (P,Q, f)-GDDHE have generic security when f /∈ < P,Q >.
4.4 Collision-Resistant Hash Functions
The proposed CUPS scheme relies on the use of collision-resistant hash functions, defined as follows:
Definition 3. Collision-Resistant Hash Function – A hash functionH : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}m, where n,m ∈ N, is said to be collision-resistant if it
satisfies the following two properties:
• length compressing —m > n, typicallym = n/2;
• hard to find collisions — for all non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithmA, there exists a negligible function , such that for
all n ∈ N,
Pr[(x0, x1)← A(1n,H) : x0 6= x1 ∧H(x0) = H(x1)] ≤ (n)
5 CUPS: SECUREOPPORTUNISTIC CLOUDOF THINGS FRAMEWORKBASEDONATTRIBUTE BASED
ENCRYPTION SCHEME
In this section, we first give an overview of our proposed constant size CUPS scheme, while presenting themain procedures (subsection 5.1). Then,
we detail the scheme construction, in subsection 5.2.
5.1 Overview
CUPS presents a verifiable and outsourced KP-ABE scheme that ensures flexible access control, while supporting policy updates in opportunistic
cloud of things environments. CUPS scheme relies on the constant size KP-ABE scheme proposed by Belguith et al. 31, which has been extended to
fulfill the decryption delegation feature.
Figure 3 presents a detailed workflow of CUPS, while enhancing the different interactions between involved actors. Based on four phases,
Figure 3 shows the chronological sequence of seven randomized algorithms and a set of functions. Recall that some phases such as the SYS_INIT,
STORAGE and RETRIEVAL are compulsory, while the UPDATE phase is considered as optional. Similarly, some functions are considered as internal
features such as the verify function that enables a honest user to find out whether a data content that has been decrypted with the edge node
assistance is matching the ciphertext downloaded from remote server or not.
For ease of presentation, the different notations used in this paper are listed in Table 1 .
5.2 SecureOpportunistic Cloud of Things: Proposed Protocol
Our CUPS construction, supporting both attributes’ addition and revocation, is based on four phases including five algorithms defined as follows:
• SYS_INIT phase:
This phase is executed once by the CTA. It permits to generate and publish system public parameters to all involved entities and derives
users’ private keys associated to their attributes relying on the following two algorithms:
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FIGURE 3 Work Flow of CUPS Protocol
– setup – given the security parameter ξ, the attribute authority chooses three cyclic groupsG1,G2 andGT of prime order p and defines
a bilinear pairing eˆ : G1 × G2 → GT and four collusion resistant hash functionsH′ : {0, 1}∗ → ZP,H0 : {M} → {0, 1}nH0 ,H1 :
{M} → {0, 1}∗,H2 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}nH2 , whereM is the message universe and nH0 and nH2 are the output-sizes of H0 and H2
hash functions, respectively.. It also randomly selects two generators g ∈ G1 and h ∈ G2 as well as a secret random value α ∈ Z∗p .
In addition, the attribute authority sets v = eˆ(g, h), {hαi}i=1···k and {ui = gαi}i=1···k where k = |U| is the cardinal of the attributes
universesU. Finally, it chooses a cryptographic hash functionH : {0, 1}∗ ⇒ Z∗p and outputs the public parameters pp as follows:
pp = (G1,G2,GT, v = eˆ(g, h), h, {hαi}i=1···k, {ui = gαi}i=1···k)
Themaster secret key is defined asmsk = (g, α).
– keygen – it computes the private key associated to an access structureΨw.r.t. an LSSS scheme (A, ρ) such thatA is the corresponding
l× nmatrix. First, the keygen algorithm generates shares of 1 relying on the LSSS schemaw.r.t. (A, ρ), as detailed in section 4. Namely,
it chooses a column vector β = (β1, β2, · · · , βn)T, while β1 = s = 1 and β2, · · · , βn ∈ Zp. Then for each i = 1 to l, it calculates
λi =< Ai, βT >, and sets sk as follows:
sk = {Di}li=0, {(Ki,j)nj=0}li=0
= {g
λi
α+H(ρ(i)) , (hλiα
j
)nj=0}li=0
• STORAGE phase:
– encrypt – let S be the set of the encryption attributes S = {ai}mi=1 and R a random value in GT. This algorithm, executed by the
encrypting entity E takes an extra input which is amaximum revocation number r ≤ m. This algorithms runs w.r.t following two steps:
(i) The data owner chooses s ∈ Z∗p and computes the ciphertextCT as follows:
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TABLE 1 The different notations used in this paper
Notation Description
RC Remote Cloud Server
CTA Central Trusted Authority
EN EdgeNode
O DataOwner
U User
M Message
U The attribute universe
k The size of the attribute universeU
M Themessage universe
pp Public Parameters
msk Master Secret Key
a An attribute
Ψ A user access policy
U A set of attributes to be added/removed to an encrypting access policy
l The size ofU
S An encrypting access policy
S′ An updated encrypting access policy
sk Secret key related to a userU
tk A transformation key related to userU
tpk A transformation public key
tsk A transformation private key
CT The ciphertext
CT′ The updated ciphertext
Y The partially decryptedmessage
E1 An exponentiation overhead inG1
E2 An exponentiation overhead inG2
E An exponentiation overhead inG
τP The computation overhead of a pairing function eˆ
O(M) The size of amessageM
H The overhead of a hash function
m The size of encrypting set of attributes or the encryption access policy
n The size of the user access policy or the set of attributes used to generate his secret keys
r Themaximum number of attributes that can be revoked from an access policy
Ω The size of a ciphertext element in bits
Φ The size of a user’s secret key element in bits

E0 = h
s·∏ai∈S(α+H(ai))
E1 = Eα0 , · · · ,Ek−m = Eαk−m−1
C1 = u
−s
1 =, · · · ,Cr+1 = u−sr+1
C = R · eˆ(g, h)s
(ii) Afterwards, the algorithm computes R0 = H0(R) and a symmetric keyK = H1(R). O encrypts the messageM using a symmetric
encryption algorithm encK such thatCK = encK(K,M). The verification key is computed asV = H2(R0||CK).
• UPDATE phase:
– update – the update algorithm first checks the operation indicator ind. Then, if ind = add, it proceeds as (i), otherwise if ind = revoke it
executes (ii):
(i) – given a ciphertext CT encrypted w.r.t. a set of attributes S and U = {a′1, · · · , a′t} a new set of attributes where U ∩ S = ∅, the
server has to add elements ofU to the set of encrypting attributesS of the ciphertextCT. To do so, it proceeds as follows:
Let F(x) be the polynomial in x defined as F(x) =∏ai∈U (x +H(ai)) = ftxt + ft−1xt−1 + · · ·+ f0
Then, the algorithm computes E′0 = EF(α)0 = ∏ti=0 Efii . The new ciphertext is then defined as CT′ = (E′0,C1,C)w.r.t. S′, the new set
of encrypting attributes defined asS′ = S ∪ U .
(ii) – given a ciphertextCT encrypted w.r.t. a set of attributes S and a revocation attribute setU = {a′1, · · · , a′t} ⊆ S where t ≤ r, the
server updates the ciphertextCT as follows:
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Let F(x) be the polynomial in x as F(x) = 1∏
ai∈UH(ai)
∏
ai∈U (x +H(ai)) = ftxt + ft−1xt−1 + · · ·+ f0
Then, the algorithm computesCT′ as follows:
E′0 = E
1∏
ai∈U H(ai)
0 = h
s·∏ai∈S\U(α+H(ai))F(α)
C′1 =
∏t+1
t=1 C
fi−1
i = g
−αs∑t+1
i=1
αi−1fi−1 = u
−sF(α)
1
C′ = Ceˆ(
∏t
i=1 C
−fi
i , h) = Reˆ(g, h)
s
∑t
i=0
fiα
i
= RvsF(α)
• RETRIEVAL phase:
During the RETRIEVAL phase, U has first to request access to a particular data content, for the cloud provider. Once retrieved from RC, U
runs an interactive protocol with the edge node (EN), to recover the original data content. The RETRIEVAL phase relies on the following three
algorithms:
– transform – U executes this algorithm to generate the transformation keys. He first picks a random value z ∈ Z∗N, then derives the
transformation public and private keys tk = (tpk, tsk), where tpk and tsk are computed as follows:
tpk = sk
1
z = ({Di}li=0)
1
z , ({(Ki,j)nj=0}li=0)
1
z
tsk = z
Therefore, tpk and tsk are defined as:
tpk = sk
1
z = g
λi
z(α+H(ρ(i))) , (h
λiα
j
z )nj=0}li=0
tsk = z
Finally, U outsources the ciphertext as downloaded fromRC along with the transformation public key tpk to the EN.
– decryptout – the cipherext CT′ is encrypted under the set of attributes S . EN which received the transformation public key tpk first
sets I = i|ρ(i) ∈ S′, and calculates the reconstruction of constants µi∈I = Recon((A, ρ),S). The decryption key corresponding to the
LSSS schemew.r.t. (A, ρ) is parsed as tpk = {(Di) 1z , ((Ki,j)nj=0}li=0) 1z . Then, EN computes the polynomial on the variableαwith degree
m + t− 1 as follows:
Pi,A(α) =
λi
α
(
∏
j=1,j 6=i
(α+H(aj))−
∏
j=1,j 6=i
H(aj)))
EN calculates h Pi,A(α)z according to the transformation public key component ((Ki,j)nj=0) 1z . Afterwards, EN computes Yi which can be
retrieved based on two cases w.r.t. the ind operator value, such that:
* Case 1: if attributes have been added to the access policy:
Yi = (eˆ(C1, h
Pi,A(α)
z ) · eˆ((Di)
1
z ,C2))
1∏
j=1,j6=i H(ai))
= eˆ(g, h)
sλi
z
* Case 2: if attributes have been revoked from the access policy:
Yi = (eˆ(C
′
1, h
Pi,A(α)
z ) · e((Di)
1
z ,E′0))
1∏
j=1,j6=i H(ai))
= eˆ(g, h)
sF(α)λi
Z
Finally, EN computesY =∏i∈I Yµii = eˆ(g, h) sz and returns it to the userU.
– decrypt – This algorithm includes two steps. The first step, denoted by (i), enables U to retrieve the plaintext, while the second step (ii)
permits to verify the correctness of the partially decryptedmessage received from EN:
(i) First,U usesY to retrieve the plaintext. Based on the partially decrypted ciphertextY,U performs only one exponentiationwithout
calculating anypairing functions to recover themessage.M canbe retrievedbasedon two casesw.r.t. the indoperator value, such that:
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* Case 1: in the case of adding attributes to the access policy:
R =
C
(Y)tsk
=
R · (eˆ(g, h)s
(eˆ(g, h)
s
z )z
=
R · (eˆ(g, h)s
eˆ(g, h)s
* Case 2: in the case of revoking attributes from the access policy:
R =
C′
(Y)tsk
=
R · (eˆ(g, h)sF(α)
(eˆ(g, h)
sF(α)
z )z
=
R · (eˆ(g, h)sF(α)
eˆ(g, h)sF(α)
Note that if no changes have beenmade to the access policy and the corresponding ciphertext, the decryption process followsCase 1.
(ii) To retrieve the message M, U first computes R0 = H(R). Then, he computes H2(R0||CK) and compares it against V. If V 6=
H2(M0||CK), then decrypt returns ⊥. Otherwise, he computes the symmetric key K = H1(R), then decrypts the message M =
decK(K,CK).
6 SECURITYANALYSIS
The security of CUPS relies on the following Theorems.
Theorem 1. Correctness. The correctness property requires that for all security parameter ξ, all attribute universe descriptions U, all (pp, msk) ∈
setup(ξ), all (S,U) ⊆ U (i.e; U is the attribute universe), all sk ∈ keygen(pp, msk,Ψ), allM ∈ M (i.e;M is the message universe), all Ψ ∈ G (G is
the access policy space), all CT ∈ encrypt(pp,S,M), and all CT′ ∈ update(pp,CT, ind,U), all transformation keys tk ∈ transform(pp, sk,Ψ), all
partially decyrpted messages Y ∈ decryptout(pp, tpk,CT′), if the user has correctly obtained the secret key sk related to the Ψ required access
policyS′ for deciphering the encryptedmessage, the derypt( tsk,Y) outputsM.
Theorem 2. Confidentiality. The proposed CUPS scheme is indistinguishable against replayable chosen ciphertext attacks, w.r.t. the GDHE
assumption.
Theorem3. Verifiability IfH0 andH2 are collision-resistant hash functions, then the proposedCUPS scheme is verifiable against lazy andmalicious
edge nodes.
Here-after, we start by proving the correctness of the proposed scheme. Afterwards, we introduce the security proofs related to security games
presented in Section 2.5.
6.1 Correctness
In this subsection, we show the correctness of CUPS w.r.t. Theorem 1, while detailing the update process in subsection 6.1.1 and the decryption
algorithms in subsection 6.1.2.
6.1.1 Update Correctness
A user U who possesses a set of attributes expressed with respect to an access structure Ψ, satisfying S′ first sets Pi,A(α) = λiα (
∏
j=1,j 6=i(α +
H(aj))−
∏
j=1,j 6=iH(aj))). Then, U uses his secret keys to computeYi with respect to the two following cases:
• Case 1: if ind = add andS′ = S ∪ U , thenYi is computed as:
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Yi = [eˆ(C
′
1, h
Pi,A(α) ) · eˆ(Di,E′0)]
1∏
j=1,j6=i H(aj))
= [eˆ(g−αs, hPi,A(α) ) · eˆ(g
λi
α+H(ρ(i)) ,E
F(α)
0 )]
1∏
j=1,j6=i H(aj))
= [eˆ(g−αs, hPi,A(α) ) · eˆ(g
λi
α+H(ρ(i)) , h
s·∏aj∈A(α+H(aj))F(α))] 1∏j=1,j6=i H(aj))
= [eˆ(g, h)−αsPi,A(α) · eˆ(g, h)sλiF(α)·
∏
j=1,j6=i(α+H(aj)))]
1∏
j=1,j6=i H(aj))
= [eˆ(g, h)−sλi(
∏
j=1,j6=i(α+H(aj))eˆ(g, h)sλi
∏
j=1,j6=iH(aj) · eˆ(g, h)sλiF(α)·
∏
j=1,j6=i(α+H(aj))]
1∏
j=1,j6=i H(aj)
= [eˆ(g, h)sλi
∏
j=1,j6=iH(aj)]
1∏
j=1,j6=i H(aj)
= eˆ(g, h)sλi
Afterwards, the user U computes:
Y =
∏
i∈I
Yµii
=
∏
i∈I
eˆ(g, h)sλiµi
= eˆ(g, h)s
∑
i∈I λiµi
= eˆ(g, h)s
Recall that the constantsmui∈I are the reconstruction of the LSSSmatrixµi∈I = Recon((A, ρ),A). Therefore, the user retrievesY using the
following equation
< λ, µ >=
∑
i∈I
λiµi =
∑
i∈I
β1 =
∑
i∈I
1 = 1
• Case 2: if ind = revoke andS′ = S \ U ,Yi is computed as follows:
Yi = [eˆ(C
′
1, h
Pi,A(α) ) · eˆ(Di,E′0)]
1∏
j=1,j6=i H(aj))
= [eˆ(u
−sF(α)
1 , h
Pi,A(α) ) · eˆ(g
λi
α+H(ρ(j)) , h
s·∏aj∈A\U(α+H(aj))F(α))] 1∏j=1,j6=i H(aj))
= [eˆ(g, h)−sλiF(α)(
∏
j=1,j6=i(α+H(ai))−
∏
j=1,j6=iH(ai))) · eˆ(g, h)sλi·
∏
j=1,j6=i(α+H(aj))F(α))]
1∏
j=1,j6=i H(aj))
= [eˆ(g, h)−sλiF(α)(
∏
j=1,j6=i(α+H(ai)) · eˆ(g, h)sλiF(α)
∏
j=1,j6=iH(ai))) · eˆ(g, h)sλiF(α)·
∏
j=1,j6=i(α+H(aj)))]
1∏
j=1,j6=i H(aj))
= eˆ(g, h)
sλiF(α))
∏
j=1,j6=i H(ai)∏
j=1,j6=i H(aj)
= eˆ(g, h)sF(α)λi
Afterwards, the user computes:
Y =
∏
i∈I
Yµii
=
∏
i∈I
eˆ(g, h)sF(α)λiµi
= eˆ(g, h)sF(α)
∑
i∈I λiµi
= eˆ(g, h)sF(α)
Recall that the constantsmui∈I are the reconstruction of the LSSSmatrixµi∈I = Recon((A, ρ),A). Therefore, the user retrievesY using the
following equation
< λ, µ >=
∑
i∈I
λiµi =
∑
i∈I
β1 =
∑
i∈I
1 = 1
6.1.2 Decryption Correctness
We assume a data user U having an access policy Ψ which satisfies the encryption set of attributes S . In the following, we prove the
correctness of CUPS, i.e., U can retrieve the plaintext message using his access policy and the related secret keys.
First, U derives the transformation keys tk = (tsk, tpk). Afterwards, he forwards the public transformation key tpk to EN.
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This algorithm includes two steps. The first step, denoted by (i), enables U to retrieve the plaintext, while the second step (ii) permits to
verify the correctness of the partially decryptedmessage received from EN:
(i) Based on the partially decrypted ciphertext Y, U performs only one exponentiation without calculating any pairing functions to recover
the randommessage.R can be retrieved based on two cases w.r.t. the ind operator value, such that:
– Case 1: in the case of adding attributes to the access policy:
R =
C
(Y)tsk
=
R · (eˆ(g, h)s
(eˆ(g, h)
s
z )z
=
R · (eˆ(g, h)s
eˆ(g, h)s
– Case 2: in the case of revoking attributes from the access policy:
R =
C′
(Y)tsk
=
R · (eˆ(g, h)sF(α)
(eˆ(g, h)
sF(α)
z )z
=
R · (eˆ(g, h)sF(α)
eˆ(g, h)sF(α)
Note that if no changes have beenmade to the access policy and the corresponding ciphertext, the decryption process followsCase 1.
(ii) To verify that the retrieved message M is correct, U first computes M0 = H(M). Then, he computes H2(M0||CK) and compares it
againstV. IfV 6= H2(M0||CK), then decrypt returns⊥. Otherwise, EN has executed decrypt correctly and the retrieved plaintext is verified.
Therefore, he computes the symmetric keyK = H1(R), then decrypts themessageM = decK(K,CK).
6.2 Confidentiality
In the following proof, we prove that our CUPS scheme is CPA-Secure against non-adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attacks with respect to Theorem 4.
Theorem 4. For any adversaryA, against CPA-Secure against non-adaptive chosen ciphertext, our CUPS scheme is indistinguishable according to
Definition 2.5 with respect to the hardness of the General Diffie-Hellman Exponent (GDHE) assumption ( Definition 4.3)
Proof. To decrypt a ciphertext CT’ associated with an updated access policy S′, A must recover eˆ(g, h)s, in case of attributes’ addition and
eˆ(g, h)s
∑t
i=0
fiα
i , in case of attributes’ revocation, where the secret sharing key s is embedded in the ciphertext.
To prove that our scheme is secure against selective non-adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks, we first consider that A is running the Expconf
experiment with an entity B. This latter is running the ExpB . Wang et al. security game 39, with C. The objective of this proof is to show that the
advantage ofA to win the GS−CPA(1κ) security game is equivalent to the advantage of ExpB to win theWang et al. security game 39. Hereafter,A
andB proceed as follows:
INITIALISATION – in this phase, the adversaryA gives the algorithm C a challenge set of attributesS∗.
SETUP – the challenger C runs the setup(ξ) algorithm, sends the public parameters pp = (G1,G2,GT, v = eˆ(g, h), gα, h, hα, · · · , hαk , {ui =
gα
i}i=1···k) toB and keeps secret msk. Consequently,B sends pp toA.
QUERY PHASE 1 – B sets an empty tableT and queries an access policyΨA,i, for each session i. That is, B uses C to derive and send the queried
secret keys toA. The challenger C answers by running the keygen(pp, msk,ΨA,i) algorithm. The challenger C generates shares of 1 relying on the
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LSSS schema w.r.t. (A, ρ). It chooses a column vector β = (β1, β2, · · · , βn)T, while β1 = s = 1 and β2, · · · , βn ∈ Zp. Then for each i = 1 to l, it
calculates λi =< Ai, βT >, and sets sk as skA,i = {g
λi
α+H(ρ(i)) , (hλiα
j
)nj=0}li=0.
Note that the access policy ΨA,i does not satisfy the encryption attribute set S∗. The private keys skA,i = {g
λi
α+H(ρ(i)) , (hλiα
j
)nj=0}li=0 are
returned toB. Subsequently,B sets a new entry with the private key and returns skA,i = {g
λi
α+H(ρ(i)) , (hλiα
j
)nj=0}li=0 toA.
CHALLENGE PHASE – during the challenge phase,A picks two equal length cleartextsM0∗ andM1∗ as well as an attribute set U∗ with |U∗| = t
U∗ ∩ S∗ = ∅ if ind = add or U∗ ⊂ S∗ if ind = revoke. Subsequently, B selects SB such that SB ⊆ S′∗, such as S ′∗ = S∗ \ U∗ for ind = add or
S ′∗ = S∗ ∩ U∗ for ind = revoke.
Afterwards, B sends the access structure SB and the two equal length messagesM0 andM1, defined by A to the challenger C. The challenger C
chooses a random bit b from {0, 1}with S′B = SB \ U∗ for ind = add or S′B = SB ∩ U∗ for ind = revoke and computes the challenge encrypted
messageCTb∗ = encrypt(pp,S′B,Mb∗).
E0 = h
s·∏ai∈S′B (α+H(ai))
E1 = Eα0 , · · · ,Ep−m = Ep−m−1
C1 = u
−s
1 =, · · · ,Cr+1 = u−sr+1
C = R · vs = R · eˆ(g, h)s
The challenger C givesCTb∗ to the adversary ifU = ∅, otherwiseCT′∗b = update(pp,CTb∗, ind,U∗).
QUERY PHASE 2 – in this phase, the adversary A can query a polynomially bounded number of queries as in QUERY PHASE 1, except that A
cannot query secret keys related to a set of attributesS∗.
Hereafter, two cases are consideredw.r.t. the ind operator value, randomly selected by C in order to encrypt the challengingmessage such that:
• Case 1 – the first case corresponds to attributes’ addition, such that C sets S′B = SB ∪ U∗ and outputs an encrypted message CT′b, as
defined in section 5.2. In this case,wefirst show that howa challenge ciphertext should be produced. In fact, given a ciphertextCT encrypted
w.r.t. a set of attributes SB and U∗ = {a′1, · · · , a′t} a new set of attributes where U ∩ S = ∅, C has to add elements of U∗ to the set of
encrypting attributesSB of the ciphertextCT′b. To do so, it proceeds as follows:
Let F(x) be the polynomial in x defined as F(x) = ∏ai∈U∗ (x +H(a′i )) = ftxt + ft−1xt−1 + · · · + f0 Then, the algorithm computes E′∗0 =
E∗F(α)0 =
∏t
i=0 E
fi
i . The new ciphertext is then defined as CT′b = (E′∗0,C1,C) w.r.t. S′, the new set of encrypting attributes defined as
S′B = SB ∪ U∗.
• Case 2 – the second case corresponds to attributes’ revocation, such that C defines S′B = SB \ U∗ and outputs an encrypted mes-
sage CT′b, as detailed in section 5.2. That is, given a ciphertext CT encrypted w.r.t. a set of attributes S′B and a revocation attribute
set U∗ = {a′1, · · · , a′t} ⊆ S′B where t ≤ r, the server updates the ciphertext CT′b as follows: Let F(x) be the polynomial in x as
F(x) = 1∏
a′
i
∈U∗ H(a′i )
∏
a′
i
∈U (x+H(a′i )) = ftxt+ft−1xt−1+· · ·+f0. Similarly, thenewciphertext is thendefinedasCT′b = (E′∗0,C′∗1,C′∗M)
w.r.t.S′, the new set of encrypting attributes defined asS′B = SB \ U∗.
Without loss of generality, the distribution of the received challenge ciphertext does not depend on the attributes’ addition and revocation.
More precisely, the distribution of the challenge enciphered message is quite similar in both cases. Thus, the resistance of CUPS scheme against
CPA, followsWang et al. construction 39 construction, w.r.t. to B, that is proven secure under the GDDHE assumption. Thus, the view of B is indis-
tinguishable from the view ofA, considering a randomly selected encipheredmessage w.r.t.S′B referring to the updated access policy.
As such, we prove that our CUPS construction is secure against selective non-adaptive chosen ciphertexts attacks in the standard model, under
the GDDHE assumption, with respect to Expconf security experiment.
6.3 Verifiability
Proof. The Expverif security games, presented in 2.5.2 captures the behaviour of lazyor amalicious edge node EN. That is, the goal of an adversaryA
is to forge a compromised partially decrypted ciphertext, that can be correctly verified by the challenger C, by running decrypt algorithm.
To this end, we define an adversaryA running the Expverif security game with an entity B. This entity B is also running a collusion attack against
hash functionHwith a challenger C. The aim of this proof is to demonstrate that the advantage of the adversaryA to succeed in the Expverif game
is smaller than the advantage of the entityB to win the collusion game. In the following, we prove that CUPS is verifiable against lazy andmalicious
ENw.r.t Theorem 5.
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Theorem 5. IfH2 andH0 are two collision-resistant hash functions, then, CUPS is verifiable against lazy EN.
B executes the setup algorithm to generate the public parameters except the hash functionsH2 andH0. Then,B executes bothQueries phase 1
andQueries phase 2 to issue the secret and transformation keys.
During the challenge phase, A forwards a challenge message M∗ to B. B chooses a random message R∗ ∈ GT and encrypts R∗ under the
challenge access S∗. Then, B defines R∗0 = H∗0 (R∗) and computes a symmetric keyK∗ = H∗1 (R∗). B execures the encryption of the messageM∗
using a symmetric encryption algorithm encK such asCK∗ = encK(K∗,M∗). C defines the verification keyV∗ = H∗2 (R∗0 ||C∗K).B sends the computed
ciphertext toA as a challenge ciphertext as well as the verification keyV∗.
IfA breaks the verifiability game,Bwill recover amessageM /∈ {M∗,⊥} relying on the partially decryption algorithm decryptout.
Notice that the decryption algorithm outputs⊥ ifH∗2 (R∗0 ||C∗K) 6= V∗ whereR∗0 = H∗0 (R∗) andR∗ = decK(K,CK). In the following we consider
the two cases:
• Case 1: SinceB knows (R∗0 ,C∗K), if (R0,CK) 6= (R∗0 ,C∗K) is returned as a result, thenB obtains a collision of the hash functionH∗2 .
• Case 2: If (R0,CK) = (R∗0 ,C∗K), whileR∗ andR are not equal (R∗ 6= R). Then,B breaks the collision resistance condition ofH∗0 asH∗0 (R) =
R0 = R∗0 = H∗0 (R∗).
Consequently, using an absurdum reasoning, since the hash functionsH2 andH0 are two collision resistant functions, CUPS is verifiable.
7 PERFORMANCESANALYSIS
In this section, we present the computation and the storage complexities of our proposed CUPS scheme. In our analysis, we are interested in the
computations performed to execute the encrypt, update and the decrypt algorithms as presented in Table 2 . Furthermore, the size of the generated
encryptedmessage, the size of the secret keys and the communications costs between the system entities are introduced in Table 3 .
TABLE 2 Features and Functionality Comparison of Attribute Based Encryption Schemes
Scheme Policy Update Outsourcing Verifiability Access Policy Type Encryption Cost Update Cost User Decryption Cost EN Decryption Cost
Emura et al. 43 7 7 7 AND-Gates CP-ABE 2E1 + E – 2τp + 3E1 –
Herranz et al. 36 7 7 7 Monotone KP-ABE 2E1 + E – (n + 1)E1 + 5τp + E –
Ge et al. 37 7 7 7 Threshold CP-ABE 5E1 + E – 4τp + 2E1(k− n) –
Wang et al. 39 7 7 7 Monotone KP-ABE 2E1 + E – (n + 1)E + E1 + 2τp –
Zuo et al. 52 7 X 7 Monotone CP-ABE E + E1(k + 1) + 2O(H) – 4E + 4O(H) τp(4 + 2k + n) + kE +O(H)
Lin et al. 53 7 X X Monotone CP-ABE E1(1 + 4n) + E + 2O(H) – E + 2O(H) 2nE + τp(2n + 1)
Li et al. 41 7 X X AND gates CP-ABE 6E1 + 2E +O(H) – 4τp E + 2O(H)
Belguith et al. 12 7 X X Monotone CP-ABE 5E1 + ET + 3O(H) – ET + 3O(H) 3nτp + ET
Jiang et al. 30 X 7 7 Threshold CP-ABE (k−m + 2)E1 + E tE1 nE1 + 2τp –Threshold CP-ABE (r + 2)E1 + E (2t + 2)E1 + τp nE1 + 2τp –
Belguith et al.(The conference Version) X 7 7 Monotone KP-ABE (k−m + 2 + r)E1 + E tE1/(2t + 2)E1 + τp 2τp + E1 + (n + 1)E –
CUPS X X X Monotone KP-ABE (k−m + 2 + r)E1 + E + 1 tE1/(2t + 2)E1 + τp 2τp + E1 + nE E + 2O(H)
7.1 Storage and Communication Complexities
Emura et al. 43 introduced a KP-ABE scheme requiring only 2 keys per user independent of the users’ attributes. In addition, this scheme generates
a ciphertext composed only of 3 elements.
Herranz et al. 36 have proposed the first CP-ABE scheme generating a ciphertext whose size does not depend on the number of attributes used in
the threshold access policy. In this scheme, the user needs k + n secret keys’ where k is the cardinal of the attributes universes and n is the number
of the users’ attributes.
In 37, the authors proposes a CP-ABE schemewith constant ciphertext size. However, this schemes requires the use of 3k− 2 + n secret keys.
Similarly, the authors in 39 proposed aKP-ABE schemewhich produces only 3 elements in the ciphertext. The users’ secret keys are equal to k(n+1).
This size of secret keys is due to the use of LSSS monotone access policies which makes the scheme more expressive than the aforementioned
schemes.
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TABLE 3 Comparison of Storage Costs and CommunicationOverheads between CUPS and Closely Related ABE Scheme
Schemes Outsourcing Key Size Transformation Ciphertext Size SYSINIT STORAGE RETRIEVAL FromCSP RETRIEVAL From ENKey size Communication Cost (bits) Communication Cost (bits) Communication Cost (bits) Communication Cost (bits)
Emura et al. 43 7 2 – 3 |pp|+ 2Φ 3Ω 3Ω –
Herranz et al. 36 7 k + n – 3 |pp|+ (k + n)Φ 3Ω 3Ω –
Ge et al. 37 7 3k− 2 + n – 4 |pp|+ (3k− 2 + n)Φ 4Ω 4Ω –
Wang et al. 39 7 k(n + 1) – 3 |pp|+ k(n + 1)Φ 3Ω 3Ω –
Lin et al. 53 X 2 + n 3 + n 4 + m |pp|+ (2 + n)Φ (4 + m)Ω (4 + m)Ω (3 + n)Φ + (4 + m)Ω
Zuo et al. 52 X k + n + 1 k + 2 5 + k |pp|+ (k + n + 1)Φ (5 + k)Ω (5 + k)Ω (k + 2)Φ + (5 + k)Ω
Li et al. 41 X 2 3 8 2Φ 8Ω 8Ω 3Φ + 8Ω
Belguith et al. 12 X 2n 2n + 3 4 + 3m |pp|+ (4n + 1)φ (4 + 3m)Ω (4 + 3m)Ω (2n + 3)φ+ (3 + 3m)Ω
Jiang et al. 30 7 n + 1 – 3 + k−m / 3 |pp|+ (n + 1)Φ (3 + k−m)Ω 3Ω −−
n + 1 – r + 3 / 3 |pp|+ (n + 1)Φ (r + 3)Ω 3Ω
Belguith et al.(Conference Version) 31 7 (n + 1)k – 3 + k−m + r/3 |pp|+ (n + 1)kΦ (3 + k−m + r)Ω 3Ω −−
CUPS X (n + 1)k (n + 1)k + 1 3 + k−m + r/3 |pp|+ (n + 1)kΦ (3 + k−m + r)Ω 4Ω ((n + 1)k)Φ + 3Ω
Although, the above schemes ensure low storage and communication costs, they donot support access policy updates. Indeed, if the access rights
changewith the addition or the revocation of some attributes, outsourced data need to be re-encrypted.
Jiang et al. 30, have proposed a thresholdCP-ABE scheme supporting access policy update. The authors proposed twodifferent construction. The
first construction ensures the addition of attributes to the access policy. This incurs the generation of a ciphertext whose size is equal to 3 + k−m
to be forwarded to the cloud server however the final user only receives 3 elements of the ciphertext no matter how many attributes are used in
the access policy. The second construction provides the ability to revoke attributes from the access policy. Therefore, the generated access policy
depends on the maximum number of attributes in an attribute revocation list. Like the first construction, the user only needs three elements to
decrypt data. Both the proposed construction require n + 1 secret keys for every user.
In our CUPS scheme, we apply a compact policy update technique to ensure adding and/or removing attributes from access policies in KP-ABE
schemes. Therefore, the proposed construction generates a ciphertext size equal to 3 + k + r −m. Users receives a constant ciphertext size inde-
pendent from the number of attributes involved in the access policy and from the applied update procedures. CUPS relies in usingmonotone access
policies, then the users secret keys are equal to n + k elements. Therefore, the proposed CUPS scheme ensures expressiveness and policy updates
while introducing comparative storage with similar ABE schemes.
Regarding the communication costs, CUPS provides reasonable communication costs compared to similar ABE schemes. It requires the same
communication costs between the data owner and the cloud server as other ABE schemes supporting access policy update such as Jiang et al.
scheme 30 andPU-ABE scheme 31. However, it requires an additional communicationoverheadbetween thedata user and the edgenode todelegate
the decryption overhead similar to ABE schemes supporting decryption outsourcing 12,52,41.
Overall, CUPS introduces two interesting features, i.e., outsourced decryption and access policy update while incurring reasonable storage and
communication overheads.
7.2 Computation Complexities
The proposed schemes in 43, 36 and 39 introduce an encryption algorithmwhich requires two exponentiations inG1 and one exponentiation inG. Ge
et al.’s scheme 37 introduces an encryption algorithm requiring 5 exponentiations inG1 and one exponentiation inG.
In Emura et al.’ scheme 43, the user needs to perform two pairing operations and 3 exponentiations in G1. Herranz et al. 36 decryption algorithm
requires n + 1 exponentiations in G1, 5 pairing functions and one exponentiation in G. In 37 scheme, the users executes 4 pairing operations and
2(k−n) exponentiations inG1.Wang et al. proposed aKP-ABE scheme 39 where the decryption algorithmperforms n+1 exponentiations inG, one
exponentiation inG1 and two pairing operations.
The aforementioned schemes do not ensure access policies update. Jiang et al.’s scheme is the first CP-ABE scheme supporting policy updates.
In this scheme, the encryption algorithm related to the attributes addition construction require k − m + 2 exponentiations in G1 and only one
exponentiation inG. In addition, the attribute revocation encryption algorithms requires r + 2 exponentiations inG1 and only one exponentiation
inG. This proposal consists in executing an update algorithmby the cloud server to update the used access policy used in the encryption. Therefore,
it requires t exponentiations in G1 to add attributes and 2t + 2 exponentiations in G1 and one pairing operation to revoke attributes. In 30, the
decryption algorithm incurs 2τp + nE1 overhead.
CUPS scheme requires the executionof (k−m+2+r)exponentiations inG1 andonly oneexponentiation inG. Theproposed scheme requires the
execution of two update functions to add attributes or revoke attributes from the access policy. To add new attributes, it requires t exponentiations
inG1 while revoking t attributes needs to an overhead equal to (2t + 2)E1 + τp, where t is the number of attributes to be added or removed. Our
CUPS scheme requires 2τp + E1 + (n + 1)E as a decryption overhead due to the use of monotone access policies.
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Above all, our proposedCUPS schemepresents quite similar processing costs compared to those incurred bymost of the reviewedABE schemes,
while providingmore practical features mainly related to expressiveness, decryption delegation and policy update.
8 CONCLUSIONS
Attribute based encryption is often used to ensure encrypted access control to outsourced data for multi-user settings. That is, in several
applications, users are removed and/or added, thus, it require an efficient update of users’ access rights.
In this paper, we propose CUPS, a novel opportunistic computing protocol based on a key policy attribute based encryption scheme that gener-
ates short size ciphertexts and supports access policy update and decryption outsourcing features. This protocol allows addition and/or revocation
of attributes without relying on a proxy server which makes it suitable for dynamic scenario such as opportunistic networks. To suit resources con-
strained devices, the users are able to offload the decryption overhead to the nearest edge node to partially decrypt the ciphertext while being
capable of verifying that the edge node is honest in computing the partial decryption process.
As future work, we aim to test the performances of CUPS in a real-world environment by implementing the different algorithms in an
opportunistic cloud of things environment.
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